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Abstract.
Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are international offenses and
perpetrators can be prosecuted abroad if accountability is not pursued at home. The
US torture policy, instituted by the Bush administration in the context of the “war on
terror” presents a contemporary example of liability for gross crimes under
international law. For this reason, classification and secrecy have functioned in
tandem as a shield to block public knowledge about prosecutable offenses. Keeping
such information secret and publicizing deceptive official accounts that contradict the
truth are essential to propaganda strategies to sustain American support or apathy
about the country’s multiple current wars. Although a great deal of information and
evidence has come to light about the US torture policy, there has been no thorough
domestic investigation up the chain of command, no full public disclosure, and no
effort to prosecute its intellectual authors in US courts. The classified diplomatic
cables allegedly provided to Wikileaks by Bradley Manning have revealed one critical
way in which this unaccountability has been enforced. This article addresses four
issues: First, a consideration of the importance of accountability for torture and other
gross violations of international law; second, a summary of efforts to hold US officials
accused of torture-related offenses accountable in European courts; third, an
examination of several leaked diplomatic cables that expose the lengths to which both
the Bush and Obama administrations have gone to derail these foreign criminal
investigations in Germany and Spain; and fourth, the unexpected consequences that
leaks played in unleashing anti-authoritarian uprisings in the Arab world and the
possibilities of future accountability.
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The right not to be tortured is the most universal and,
arguably, the most important right that human beings have because it
applies to all people everywhere under all circumstances, including in
the context of war and armed conflict, and it is absolutely nonderogable (Hajjar 2009a). The right not to be tortured is a negative
right, constituted through the prohibition of practices that meet the
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legal definition of torture, namely those acts of omission or
commission that purposefully cause severe physical harm and/or
mental suffering to people who are in custody but have not been
found guilty of any crime. (The prohibition excludes the harms arising
from lawful, court-ordered punishments regardless of their brutality.)
Thus, the legal prohibition of torture imposes a sharp limit on the
rights of states by depriving state agents and anyone acting under the
color of law (e.g., government-hired contractors) of any lawful excuse
to engage in or abet such prohibited practices.
Torture is in the same negative-right company with genocide
and war crimes. Together, these negative rights aptly have been
termed the “harder human rights” (Hagan, Schoenfeld and Palloni
2006). What distinguishes torture from violations of other harder
human rights is the custodial relationship. The clarity of the custodial
relationship (i.e., people are either in custody or they are not) and the
extreme power imbalance between custodians and prisoners
distinguishes the harms of torture from the conditions in which
violations of the other harder human rights occur. At least in theory,
people who are vulnerable to non-custodial violations can fight back,
flee or surrender. Those self-preservation options are not available to
people in custody.
The prohibition and criminality of torture is customary
international law, which creates legal obligations to prosecute people
accused of perpetrating or abetting this gross crime. When those who
are accused of engaging in torture are not prosecuted and punished,
their immunity or impunity makes a mockery of the law itself (see
Human Rights Watch 2011). Such mockery characterizes post-9/11
decisions by US officials in the Bush administration to institute
policies that disregarded the legal prohibition of torture in the
interrogation and detention of suspects captured in the “war on
terror,” and was compounded by disregarded obligations under
federal and international law to pursue accountability, which extended
to the next administration (Hajjar 2009b). President Obama has
justified this failure with the facile mantra of “looking forward, not
backward.” However, domestic unaccountability does not absolve
perpetrators and abettors because torture is a crime that attaches
universal jurisdiction, which means that perpetrators can be
prosecuted in foreign national court systems if they are not prosecuted
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in the country with jurisdiction over the accused (active personality
jurisdiction) or the country where the crime occurred (passive
personality jurisdiction).
The doctrine of universal jurisdiction is premised on the
principle that some crimes under international law—including
torture—are so grave that their perpetrators are “enemies of all
mankind” (hostis humani generis) and, therefore, that all countries have
an interest in enforcing the law against them. When torture occurs in
the context of war, as was the case in the US torture policy, it
constitutes a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, at
minimum violations of Common Article 3, which pertains to “noninternational” (i.e., not state-to-state) wars. Common Article 3
prohibits and criminalizes torture, cruel treatment, and “outrages on
human dignity” of detained people who do not qualify for prisoner-of
-war status. Such violations are war crimes, which attach a principle of
accountability similar to universal jurisdiction because the Geneva
Conventions are customary international law and impose an explicit
duty on every state party—which, since the turn of the twenty-first
century, includes every state in the world—to seek extradition of
accused war criminals or at least to avail its courts for prosecution (aut
dedere aut judicare).
The vast majority of war crimes committed in conflicts
around the world go unpunished. Torture, for reasons noted above
(i.e., the non-derogable nature of the prohibition and the clarity of the
custodial relationship), lends itself more readily to the possibility of
prosecution than other types of war crimes. The use of excessive force
or the deliberate targeting of civilians are no less illegal but impose
greater challenges to prosecution because the so-called “fog of war”
makes it more difficult to ascertain and prove that those ordering or
executing a military operation in which civilians are killed did so
intentionally. Unintentional killing of civilians in a legitimate military
operation targeting combatants is not a war crime; rather, it bears the
cold label “collateral damage.” The use of indiscriminate weaponry
(e.g., landmines, chemical weapons), which is a policy decision, is even
harder to penalize in practice because the issue of intent lies far up the
chain-of-command.
The subject of this article is the prosecutability of torture. It
begins by locating analysis of accountability for gross crimes in the
© Sociologists

~194~
Without Borders/Sociologos Sin Fronteras, 2012

Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2012

3

Societies Without Borders, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 3

L. Hajjar/Societies Without Borders 7:2 (2012) 192-225

context of the jurisprudence of violence. Then it focuses on efforts to
enforce international criminal law by holding US officials and state
agents accountable for torture and related offenses (kidnapping and
disappearance) perpetrated in the context of the “war on terror” in
foreign national court systems (primarily Germany and Spain). The
main focus, however, is on the political counter-efforts to thwart such
accountability. Information about the latter has entered the public
domain as a result of leaked, classified US State Department cables
published by the anti-secrecy organization Wikileaks.
APPLYING THE JURISPRUDENCE OF VIOLENCE TO
CRIMES OF STATE
The practice of human rights and much of the scholarship
about that practice focuses explicitly or implicitly on “the gap
problem,” namely how to close the gap between laws in the books
that establish the right to rights, and law in action to enforce those
rights, including sanctions for violations. Because violations of the
harder human rights are gross crimes, closing the gap necessitates a
prosecutorial approach to law enforcement. Redressing violations of
other types of human rights that are not criminalized require other
kinds of enforcement strategies (e.g., reporting and advocacy).
In regard to the enforcement of the harder human rights,
scholarship and activism should incorporate a greater appreciation for
the violence of law. The late Robert Cover (1995) has been credited
for ushering in and laying the ground for a “jurisprudence of
violence” (Sarat 2001: 9; see Minow, Ryan & Sarat 1995). He begins
his essay, “Violence and the Word,” with a suggestive and often cited
observation: “Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and
death” (1995: 203). By acknowledging that law not only responds to
but also metes out pain and death, Cover “achieved a crucial
conceptual breakthrough, penetrating a venerable intellectual deposit
that [had] nearly succeeded in completely concealing law’s violence as
violence” (Sarat and Kearns 2001: 53). While Cover has been
acknowledged for his intellectual insights and moral commitments, he
also has been criticized by some scholars as an “apologist for law’s
violence” (Sarat and Kearns 2001:50), and for exhibiting a “general
satisfaction with the asymmetry of power between punishers and
punished” (Simon 2001: 25). Indeed, Cover impels such readings: “If I
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have exhibited some sense of sympathy for the victims of this
violence it is misleading. Very often the balance of terror in this regard
is just as I would want it” (1995: 211). The “field of pain and death”
to which Cover refers is the American criminal justice system in which
law enforcement is shaped by enormous racial and class inequalities,
and a voracious prison complex. Jonathan Simon writes: “For that
reason we should not follow Cover’s premature effort to ‘make peace
with violence’” (2001: 42). Like Simon, many progressives, including
those whose intellectual and political commitments are devoted to the
promotion and protection of rights, are fundamentally uncomfortable
with violence, even legal violence, and wish to see themselves, their
cause, and their goals as rejoinders to violence. But Cover was right:
law is violent (in part), even if that violence is antiseptically termed
“legitimate force.”
Cover did not write about—or, arguably, envision—the
prospects for law’s violence that have developed over the last two
decades as a result of post-Cold War transformations in international
criminal law enforcement institutions and mechanisms (Bass 2001;
Bolton 2000; Bradley and Goldsmith 1997; Hajjar 2003; Hitchens
2001; Kahn 2000; Koh 1997; Macedo 2001; Neier 1998; Robertson
1998; Roht-Arriaza 2001, 2005). Those transformations have created a
new category of potential “victims of this violence”: officials and
agents of states, including powerful states, who are accused of
perpetrating gross crimes in the context of war and conflict. One
important question, with both academic and practical implications, is
whether prosecuting perpetrators of gross crimes has become or will
come to be regarded as legally obligatory, with an attendant
diminishment of executive and military discretion.
The state of international criminal law enforcement is in flux.
There is an opportunity and, I would argue, a necessity for human
rights scholars to weigh in on the merits of the prosecution of state
agents and others accused of gross crimes. The cases arising from
efforts to prosecute American perpetrators and abettors of torture in
foreign courts, as reflected in the examples below, illuminates
contemporary disagreements over how and where justice should be
pursued, and who decides if justice has been done. But to even
contemplate the issue of justice, information about crime and
criminality is a crucial ingredient.
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LEAKS AND LIES
The first indication of the largest intelligence breach in US
history appeared on April 10, 2010, when Wikileaks released a
classified US military video titled “Collateral Murder.” The footage
shows an assault in Baghdad on July 12, 2007, shot from an Apache
helicopter and accompanied by harrowing audio from a remote
command center urging on the attackers with language better suited to
a video game. The helicopter gunners shot up everything in the
vicinity and left eleven people dead, including a Reuters photographer,
his driver, and a man who had stopped his van to try to rescue one of
the wounded. The audio reveals someone laughing when an armored
vehicle runs over one of the corpses. When soldiers arrived on the
scene and discovered two badly wounded children in Good
Samaritan’s van, one can be heard saying: “Well, it's their fault
bringing their kids to a battle.”
Why was this video classified? The answer—not a good
one—is that might constitute material evidence of a war crime. At
minimum it authoritatively refutes the Pentagon’s explanation that
people on the ground had initiated the attack (see Fromkin 2010). The
video shows that only one of the men mulling in the street had a gun
slung from his shoulder and what was assumed to be a grenade
launcher turned out to be the photographer’s telephoto lens.
After the video when viral, a military intelligence analyst
based in Baghdad named Pfc. Bradley Manning revealed himself to be
the source to someone he met online named Adrian Lamo. According
to their chat logs (Hansen 2011), Manning was very clear about why
he leaked the video:
well, it was forwarded to WL [Wikileaks] - and god
knows what happens now - hopefully worldwide
discussion, debates, and reforms - if not, than [sic]
we're doomed - as a species - i will officially give up
on the society we have if nothing happens - the
reaction to the video gave me immense hope; CNN's
iReport was overwhelmed; Twitter exploded - people
who saw, knew there was something wrong . . . i
want people to see the truth . . . regardless of who
they are . . . because without information, you cannot
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make informed decisions as a public.
Manning tipped his hand in chats to Lamo that he had leaked
other materials as well, for the same reason.
hypothetical question: if you had free reign over
classified networks for long periods of time… and
you saw incredible things, awful things… things that
belonged in the public domain, and not on some
server stored in a dark room in Washington DC…
what would you do?
In July 2010, Wikileaks began releasing a trove of 90,000
classified war reports from Afghanistan and Iraq. On November 28,
the first batch of more than 250,000 State Department diplomatic
cables started being published through a collaborative agreement
between Wikileaks and major newspapers in several countries,
including the New York Times and the Guardian. (Through a series of
mistakes, the diplomatic cables in their unredacted entirety became
available in September 2011.) On April 24, 2011, Wikileaks published
Defense Department reports about past and present prisoners at
Guantánamo.
After Lamo reported these chats to the FBI, Manning was
arrested in May 2010 and transferred, via Kuwait, to the Marine brig
at Quantico where he was held in solitary confinement for eight
months and subjected to forced nudity and sensory overload. Juan
Mendez, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, who investigated
Manning’s treatment in pre-trial detention, issued a report that it
constituted cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, and possibly
torture (Pilkington 2012). Manning was transferred to Ft.
Leavenworth in April 2011. On February 24, 2012, he was arraigned
on twenty-two charged offenses under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and the draconian Espionage Act of 1917, including “aiding
the enemy” (see Greenwald 2011).
One would be hard pressed to identify how any actual
enemies of the US would gain military advantage from the “Collateral
Murder” video or assessment reports of Guantánamo detainees. It is
worth recalling that the names of those detainees who had been
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imprisoned since 2002 were classified until 2006, although that list was
leaked in 2005 by a military lawyer, Matt Diaz, who opposed the
government’s refusal to provide this information to lawyers working
on their behalf; Diaz was subsequently court-martialed (Horton 2007).
The leakage of the diplomatic cables might be construed as a plausible
threat if embarrassment were fatal.
The leaking of classified information is a criminal offense.
But the charge of aiding the enemy—and Manning is not the only
leaker so charged by the Obama administration—is revealing of the
current state of enforced secrecy and official deception in the US. The
incriminating contents of the “Collateral Murder” video and some of
the leaked documents suggest that the “enemy” is accountability for
crimes of state. Classification and secrecy have functioned in tandem
as a shield to block public knowledge about prosecutable offenses in
the “war on terror.” Keeping such information secret and publicizing
deceptive official accounts that contradict the truth are essential to
propaganda strategies to sustain public support—or public apathy—
about the country’s multiple wars. The war on whistleblowers, to
which the harsh treatment of Manning is an extreme example, is one
means of preventing such information from getting out by deterring
would-be leakers (see Greene 2011; Madar 2012; Mayer 2011).
Wikileaks is by no means the only conduit for publicizing
information about crimes of state in the context of the “war on
terror.” Over the last decade, investigative journalists like Dana Priest,
Seymour Hersh, Jane Mayer, James Risen, Charlie Savage, and Jeremy
Scahill have drawn on insider sources and leaked materials to publish
exposés about torture and extraordinary rendition, secret prisons,
warrantless spying on citizens, assassination operations, and other
illegal policies and practices. The most significant propagandaundermining event in the “war on terror” occurred on April 28, 2004,
when the leaked (albeit not classified) Abu Ghraib photos were
broadcast on CBS, and Hersh (2004) published an article in The New
Yorker about a leaked classified investigative report by Maj. Gen.
Antonio Taguba which concluded that prisoner abuse in Iraq was
“wanton” and “systematic.”
In response to the Abu Ghraib scandal, at first Bush
administration officials employed the tactic of denial by trying to
deflect chain-of-command responsibility. They blamed the shocking
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abuses on “bad apples.” As a result of political pressure for
information about the government’s secret interrogation and
detention policies, the first batch of “torture memos” were
declassified or leaked in June 2004. Those legal memoranda and policy
directives were even more shocking than the photos because they
revealed official authorization at the highest levels for torture and
inhumane treatment, including forced nudity, use of military dogs,
hooding, stress positions and sexual humiliations (see Cole 2009;
Jaffer and Singh 2007).
As a result of the flow of information about US torture into
the public domain, the Bush administration’s denial strategies (see
Cohen 2001) subsequently shifted from “literal denial”—we don’t
torture, to “euphemistic denial”—what we do is not “torture.”
Official denials were fortified by the refusal to authorize a thorough
top-down investigation of the government’s interrogation and
detention policies, the portrayal of critics as “terrorist sympathizers,”
and a novelly expansive use of the state secrets doctrine to smother
accountability-seeking litigation brought by victims in US courts.
Wikileaks, which was established in 2007, was characterized
by the US Army Counterintelligence Center as an enemy organization
in 2008. In a secret report (that Wikileaks got hold of and published),
one of the examples of the danger that Wikileaks posed was the
posting of a leaked Standard Operating Procedure manual for
Guantánamo which, according to the secret report, became the
“subject of a lawsuit by international human rights groups and a
domestic civil rights organization requesting the release of the
document under the US Freedom of Information Act.”
When Barack Obama assumed the presidency in January
2009, he cancelled the worst forms of prisoner abuse and shuttered
the CIA’s black sites. But like his predecessor, he rebuffed calls for a
thorough investigation of the US torture policy and refused to pursue
the prosecution of its intellectual authors, contending that they had
acted “in good faith.” The way in which his administration has been
able to enforce the “looking forward, not backward” agenda is by
preventing people from seeing evidence of past wrongdoing.
Government classification and redaction are currently at levels
unprecedented in US history, and the Obama administration has
prosecuted more federal employee whistleblowers than under all
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previous US presidents combined (Greene 2011).
In this environment of enforced unaccountability, leakage in
general and the materials allegedly provided by Manning in particular
pose a danger—the danger of credible information—that threatens
the political quiescence on which this unaccountability depends. Some
of the illegal policies authorized by officials, like warrantless spying
and racial profiling entrapment of citizens and residents, which
became public knowledge as a result of leaks, are entirely domestic
matters (i.e., not international crimes) for which there is no alternative
route to accountability. However, others arising from the conduct of
war that involve grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are
international offenses and therefore are potentially subject to
prosecution abroad.
In the remainder of this article, I address three issues: First, a
summary of efforts to hold US officials accused of torture-related
offenses accountable in European courts; second, an examination of
several diplomatic cables that expose the lengths to which both the
Bush and Obama administrations have gone to derail these foreign
criminal investigations into US torture and kidnapping, which
constitutes another dimension of enforced unaccountability; and third,
the unexpected consequences that Wikileaked cables played in
catalyzing revolutionary uprisings across the Arab world.
EFFORTS TO PURSUE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR US
TORTURE IN EUROPE
A variety of efforts have been mounted in European
countries to investigate aspects of the US interrogation and detention
policy and, in some countries, to criminally indict officials responsible
for torture and other offenses against prisoners (see Gallagher 2009;
Hajjar 2010; Hendricks 2010; Kaleck 2009; Ratner 2008). Here is a
partial list:


In 2004, a criminal complaint was introduced in Germany against
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and a number of other
civilian and military officials on behalf of Iraqi victims of torture
at Abu Ghraib. The case was brought in Germany for two
reasons: the country has one of the most robust laws in the books
for prosecuting international crimes, and the US maintains a large
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military presence in the country. Under intense US diplomatic
pressure, the German prosecutor dismissed the case on the
principle of subsidiarity (i.e., that a foreign court cannot assert
jurisdiction for a case that is being pursued in a more appropriate
venue), despite the fact that there was no criminal investigation of
Rumsfeld or the others named in the complaint in the US at the
time.


In 2006, a second case was brought in Germany against Rumsfeld
and several Bush administration lawyers accused of being the
architects of the torture policy. The 2006 criminal complaint
contained substantial new information about Rumsfeld’s role in
the torture of prisoners at Guantánamo, and pointed out that
subsidiarity would not be an issue because there was no domestic
investigation of the accused. In 2007, the prosecutor dismissed
the case because none of those named in the complaint was
present in the country and therefore a conviction would be
unlikely.



Following a November 2005 exposé by the Washington Post that
the CIA engaged in kidnappings and ran black sites in Europe
(subsequently revealed by Human Rights Watch to be in Poland,
Romania and Lithuania), the Council of Europe conducted an
investigation and in 2006 reported that a hundred people had
been kidnapped on the continent. The European Parliament’s
investigative report, released in February 2007 and endorsed by a
large majority, exposed extensive collusion by European security
services and other government agencies with the CIA’s
extraordinary rendition program. In January 2011, a Polish
prosecutor conducting a criminal investigation into the CIA black
site in that country recognized that Abu Zubaydah (the first “high
value detainee” taken into CIA custody in 2002) was a victim of
torture. That criminal investigation is ongoing.



In 2005, an Italian court issued indictments for twenty-six CIA
agents (along with four Italian intelligence agents) who kidnapped
Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (aka Abu Omar) in Milan in
February 2003 and transported him to Egypt where he was
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brutally tortured. The CIA mission actually disrupted an Italian
criminal investigation of Abu Omar. Despite US diplomatic
pressure and refusal to cooperate, and political opposition by the
Berlusconi government, the agents’ trial-in-absentia proceeded. In
November 2009, the Italian court handed down guilty verdicts for
most of them. The heaviest sentence, eight years, went to the
former head of the CIA’s Milan station, Robert Seldon Lady,
while twenty-one others got five years. Several higher ranking
CIA officials, including former Rome station chief Jeffrey Castelli,
were neither convicted nor acquitted because the judge ruled that
their defense was stymied by the unavailability (i.e., secrecy) of
information about their roles in the kidnapping and rendition.
Although the Italian government refused to request the
extradition of the convicted agents, the arrest warrants are active.
The convicted would be at risk if they ever travel to a country
with an extradition treaty with Italy, which includes all of Europe.


On October 26, 2007, after Rumsfeld was out of office, efforts
were made to indict him while he was in Paris. His movement was
being tracked by non-governmental organizations and a criminal
complaint had been prepared. When Rumsfeld learned of the
complaint, he fled through a side door of the building where he
was giving a speech to avoid lawyers and reporters waiting for
him outside. The complaint was dismissed by the Parisian
prosecutor in 2008 on the erroneous legal reasoning that officials
have immunity for activities connected to their work; there is no
legal immunity for torture.



The British government was implicated in the torture of Binyam
Mohamed, a British resident who was arrested in Pakistan in 2002
and extraordinarily rendered by the CIA to Afghanistan, then to
Morocco where he was held for 18 months and brutally tortured.
From Morocco he was transferred to a CIA black site near Kabul,
and then to Guantánamo in 2004. The Bush administration,
responding to British requests to release and repatriate Mohamed
(against whom there were no credible charges), offered to do so
on condition that he would remain silent about his treatment,
which he refused. He was finally released and returned to Britain
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in March 2009. The public disclosures about his treatment
sparked intense political controversy and led to the first criminal
investigation against British intelligence agents for their collusion
in CIA torture. The Obama administration threatened to suspend
bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation with Britain if documents
detailing Mohamed's extraordinary rendition and torture were
entered into evidence as part of his suit against British officials.
That effort failed: In February 2010, the High Court rejected the
Labour government's appeal to keep segments of the documents
classified and they were published. On November 16, 2010, the
British government announced that it was paying Mohamed and
five other former Guantánamo detainees millions of pounds in
compensation.


In November 2010, former President George W. Bush published
his memoir, Decision Points. In it and in subsequent media
interviews, he acknowledged (not for the first time) that he had
authorized waterboarding and other so-called “enhanced”
interrogation tactics that are universally regarded, at least beyond
US shores, as torture. In February 2011, Bush canceled his plans
to travel to Switzerland to speak at a gala benefit because a
criminal complaint had been filed against him in Geneva.



In 2007, a German court issued arrest warrants for thirteen CIA
agents involved in the January 2004 kidnapping of Khaled ElMasri, a German citizen, from Macedonia. El-Masri was
transported to Afghanistan where he was held incommunicado
for months at the Salt Pit, a CIA black site near Kabul. When the
CIA agents interrogating him realized that the arrest was a case of
mistaken identity, officials up the chain-of-command ordered his
release. He was dumped in a remote area of Albania and
eventually was able to return to Germany. The El-Masri case is
discussed in further detail in the next section because it is the
subject of a leaked diplomatic cable.



In May 2010, Spanish prosecutors issued indictments for the same
thirteen CIA agents who had kidnapped El-Masri because they
had transited through Spain. Another case in Spain involves
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efforts to criminally investigate six Bush administration lawyers
for their role in devising the torture policy and, therefore, in
abetting the torture of Spanish nationals and residents detained at
Guantánamo. These cases also are discussed further below
because they are the subject of three leaked diplomatic cables.
LEAKING THE POLITICS OF UNACCOUNTABILITY IN
GERMANY
The Wikileaks cache of secret diplomatic cables include
several pertaining to efforts to deter both the German and Spanish
governments from pursuing criminal cases against US officials and
agents. They illuminate and prove the lengths to which the US
government under both the Bush and Obama administrations has
gone to obstruct any legal accountability for the crime of torture
perpetrated by Americans.
One cable dated February 6, 2007, from the US Embassy in
Berlin has a subject line that reads : AL-MASRI [sic] CASE -CHANCELLERY AWARE OF USG CONCERNS. “USG” is the
acronym for US government. “CONCERNS” refers to the anxiety
among officials, including Condoleeza Rice who was the National
Security Advisor during El-Masri’s kidnapping and extraordinary
rendition and Secretary of State when the cable was written. The
“concern” referenced in that subject line was that Germany would
actually enforce its own criminal laws and issue indictments.
The findings of the German investigation into El-Masri’s
ordeal were publicized in that country and nurtured support for
prosecution from across the political spectrum. El-Masri had been
kidnapped in a snatch-and-grab operation on January 23, 2004. He
was beaten, stripped naked, given an enema tranquilizer (all standard
operating procedures for extraordinary renditions), and put on a ghost
plane for Afghanistan. At the Salt Pit, he was deprived of food and
drinkable water and, by his account, was sodomized. In February, CIA
agents interrogating him decided that his German passport might be
genuine, meaning that they recognized that the person they had
kidnapped and were torturing was not who they thought he was—a
suspected al-Qaeda member with a similar name. The passport was
sent to Langley for confirmation of its authenticity. By March, CIA
headquarters concluded that it was indeed genuine. But rather than
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releasing and repatriating El-Masri, the CIA continued to detain him.
In April 2004, CIA director George Tenet was informed that
a German citizen was in the Salt Pit, but he did not order El-Masri’s
release. In May, five months after the kidnapping, Rice ordered his
release. But the CIA was befuddled about how to do so without
creating an international incident and exposing their secret, illegal
operations. Only following a second order from Rice was he
“released.” But rather than being flown to Germany where his
treatment would have to be publicly acknowledged, El-Masri was
flown to Albania and dumped without money or papers on a remote
road. The Albanian police who intercepted him eventually believed
that he was German and allowed him to return home. The German
investigators took note of a statement that Rice had given to the
Washington Post that it was she who ordered El-Masri’s release. That
statement directly implicated her in the crime.
El-Masri’s detention in CIA custody had an added element
that compounded the political scandal in Germany: He had been
subjected to human experimentation, shot up with psychoactive drugs
repeatedly over the six months of his custody. This was proven
through hair, nail and skin samples (Horton 2010).
After a criminal investigation was initiated, Secretary of State
Rice and the NSA legal counsel, John Bellinger, mounted a
clandestine campaign to derail the process, warning the German
government of adverse repercussions if they allowed the case to
proceed. That warning and the responses it elicited is the topic of the
Wikileaked secret cable authored by Deputy Chief of Mission John M.
Koenig. He conveyed to the State Department that in meetings with
German officials he had emphasized that the issuance of international
arrest warrants for high-ranking US officials would have a negative
impact on the bilateral relationship. He reminded German Deputy
National Security Adviser Rolf Nikel of what had happened to USItalian relations in the wake of a similar move by Italian prosecutors
the previous year. Koening claimed that “our intention was not to
threaten Germany,” but by noting that the German federal
government had the power to stop the judicial process, the political
arm-twisting was explicit and documented.
In the cable, Koening conveyed to his bosses that Nikel had
told him there was “intense pressure from the Bundestag and the
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German media” to go forward with the case. Koening pointed out
that the US government would likewise have a difficult time in
managing domestic political implications if international arrest
warrants were issued. Nikel reiterated that he could not “promise that
everything will turn out well.” The meaning of “well” here clearly
meant the success of political collusion to thwart legal accountability
for the grave abuse of a German citizen.
The German case against top US officials died as a result of
that political interference. But the case against the CIA agents who
kidnapped El-Masri remained alive, if stalled. Although the German
government refused to seek their extradition, the arrest warrants
remain valid. One of those CIA agents was designated to be sent to a
new assignment in the United Kingdom, but the British government
warned against that because of the German warrant.
The El-Masri case was also featured in a leaked cable from
the US Embassy in Skopje, Macedonia, dated February 2, 2006. That
lengthy cable discusses a range of issues including, ironically, criticisms
of Macedonia’s underdeveloped commitment to the rule of law.
Macedonia was the country where El-Masri’s travails began with the
collusion of local security agents. The cable notes that there has been
“intense press commentary here, most of it negative,” and that
“opposition parties and opinion-shapers accuse the government of
jeopardizing Macedonia’s [European Union] accession chances by
refusing to comprehensively answer Council of Europe and European
Parliament requests for a full accounting in the case.” The cable
reveals that the Macedonian government is caught between a US rock
and an EU-accession/public opinion hard place; it favorably notes
that the government has provided “careful” responses to requests for
information, such as statements that they “have little information to
provide on el-Masri [sic] and his allegations.” El-Masri has brought a
case against Macedonia in the European Court of Human Rights.
PINOCHET’S SHADOW
Whereas the diplomatic pressure against Germany occurred
during the Bush years, similar pressure on the Spanish government
transpired under the Obama administration. One investigation
emanated from a US military assault on April 8, 2003, on a Baghdad
hotel housing journalists that killed two, one of whom was a Spanish
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cameraman for Telecinco, José Couso; three US service members
were named in a lawsuit brought by Couso’s family. A second case
targets the CIA agents who kidnapped El-Masri because they transited
through Spain using forged documents. The most politically volatile
Spanish case targets six Bush administration lawyers accused of
colluding in the intellectual authorship of the US torture policy. The
“Bush Six” are former White House counsel and Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales, David Addington who was Vice President Dick
Cheney’s counsel and then chief of staff, Pentagon General Counsel
William J. Haynes, Undersecretary of Defense Policy Douglas Feith,
Jay Bybee who was head of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), and
OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo.
Some of the details in the Bush Six case link up to larger
developments in international criminal accountability since the 1990s
(see Robertson 1998; Roht-Arriaza 2001). One of the Spanish
investigating judges was Baltasar Garzón who played a pioneering role
in developing and deploying the doctrine of universal jurisdiction to
pursue people accused of gross crimes. In 1998, when former Chilean
dictator Augusto Pinochet traveled to Britain, Garzón issued a
warrant for his arrest and an extradition to Spain to stand trial (see
Dorfman 2002; Roht-Arriaza 2005). The British Law Lords weighed
the various allegations against Pinochet; these included torture and
genocide. The latter was connected to rampant extra-judicial
executions of people suspected of being leftist subversives by the
Pinochet regime. The effort to frame such killings as genocide evinced
Garzón’s effort to broaden the definition of that crime to include the
systematic murder of political enemies. Under the Genocide
Convention of 1948, the crime is defined as “acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such.” Political groups were purposefully excluded
from the definition during in the drafting phase.
The Law Lords rejected Garzón’s attempted innovation to
expand the definition of genocide. They contended, moreover, that
these allegations of murder are not extraditable offenses because they
occurred in the context of war—the “war on communism” raging
through the Southern Cone (with US support) in the 1970s. They
maintained that killing enemies is a legitimate function of a state in
war. Therefore, Pinochet enjoyed sovereign immunity from foreign
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prosecution for deaths that occurred during this war.
However, in a landmark decision, they determined that
torture is an extraditable offense for which there is no sovereign
immunity because the torture of prisoners is not a legitimate function
of any state. The “Pinochet precedent” held that even a former head
of state could be extradited and prosecuted for torture under the
doctrine of universal jurisdiction. Pinochet managed to elude that fate
when British Home Secretary Jack Straw made a political decision to
allow him to return to Chile on the grounds that he was too frail to
withstand trial abroad. US officials had been actively working to
persuade the British government to do just that.
Nevertheless, the Pinochet precedent inspired a variety of
governments, mainly in Europe, to revise their national laws to permit
the prosecution of accused foreign perpetrators of gross crimes in
their national legal systems. Subsequent efforts to use those new or
expanded universal jurisdiction laws led to heavy political and
diplomatic backlashes from countries—notably the US and Israel—
whose civilian and military officials were targeted for war crimes
prosecutions, and some countries, like Belgium and Britain,
succumbed to foreign pressure and modified their laws to bar future
cases brought by victims against officials from friendly and powerful
nations. Most universal jurisdiction cases in Europe that have gone to
trial have involved people from Africa and the Balkans.
In Spain, Garzón was an aggressive pursuer of all kinds of
gross crimes perpetrated by states and non-state groups. He used his
judicial power to open investigations into crimes alleged to have
occurred in a variety of countries, including against Israeli officials
accused of war crimes during the second intifada and the war on Gaza
in 2008-09, as well as American officials in the context of the “war on
terror.” It was Israeli rather than American political-diplomatic
pressure that led to the 2009 narrowing of the Spanish universal
jurisdiction law. However, that law reform was not retroactive, so it
did not close down the investigation of the Bush Six.
FIGHTING ACCOUNTABILITY IN SPAIN
The case against the Bush Six is actually two cases. One,
assigned to Judge Eloy Velasco Nuňez, arose from a complaint by a
Spanish human rights organization, the Association for the Dignity of
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Spanish Prisoners, on behalf of nationals and residents who were
subjected to torture and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment at
Guantánamo. The other, for which Garzón was the investigating
judge, arose from the overturning of criminal convictions of four
former Guantánamo detainees by the Spanish Supreme Court because
the prosecution used evidence elicited through illegal interrogation
methods and was therefore inadmissible. The Supreme Court ordered
a more detailed investigation into their claims of torture.
Three Wikileaked cables from the US Embassy in Madrid,
dated April 1, April 17 and May 5, 2009, reveal the Obama
administration’s efforts to thwart these investigations, and the
willingness of Spanish political officials to collude in that effort. The
April 1 cable’s subject line reads SPAIN: PROSECUTOR WEIGHS
GTMO CRIMINAL CASE VS. FORMER USG OFFICIALS. The
summary states that the Spanish organization that filed the complaint
“is attempting to have the case heard by Investigating Judge Baltasar
Garzón, internationally known for his dogged pursuit of ‘universal
jurisdiction’ cases.” Garzón had passed the file on the Bush Six to
Chief Prosecutor Javier Zaragoza to determine if there is a legitimate
case. According to the cable, Zaragoza “told us that in all likelihood
he would have no option but to open a case.” At the time of the
meeting with Zaragoza, the cable states, “the evidence was on his desk
in four red folders a foot tall.”
Zaragoza is described as appearing “visibly displeased” to
have to deal with this matter and assured US officials that he would
argue against the case being assigned to Garzón. Although Garzón
had “first right of refusal,” Zaragoza would try to get the case
assigned to Judge Ismael Moreno instead, because he is investigating
the “illegal ‘CIA flights’ that have transited Spain carrying detainees to
Guantánamo.” Zaragoza reportedly added that “Garzón’s impartiality
was very suspect, given his public criticism of Guantánamo and the
U.S. war on terror…and his August 2008 public statements that
former President Bush should be tried for war crimes.” The one sure
way that Spain could dismiss the Bush Six case, according to
Zaragoza, would be for the US to open its own credible investigation
of the accused.
The final paragraph in the April 1 cable, titled “Comment,”
articulates official accountability anxiety quite clearly: “The fact that
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this complaint targets former Administration legal officials may reflect
a ‘stepping-stone’ strategy designed to pave the way for complaints
against even more senior officials.” The cable conveys suspicion
(accurate) that American lawyers and organizations like Human Rights
Watch and Reprieve (UK) may have been involved because the
complaint “appears to have been drafted by someone who
understands the U.S. legal system far better than the average Spanish
lawyer.” And finally, “the timing could not be worse for President
Zapatero as he tries to improve ties with the U.S. and get the Spanish
public focused on the future of the relationship rather than the past.
That said, we do not know if the government would be willing to take
the risky step of trying behind the scenes to influence the prosecutor’s
recommendation on this case or what their reaction to such a request
would be.”
Over the following two weeks, according to the April 17
cable, a concerted campaign of INTENSIVE USG OUTREACH was
waged. The Obama administration sent Senators Mel Martinez (R-FL)
and Judd Gregg (R-NH) to lobby Spanish officials to dispose of this
case. Martinez’s mission, according to the cable, was to underscore
“that the prosecutions would not be understood or accepted in the US
and would have an enormous impact on the bilateral relationship.”
The outcome of this campaign appeared tentatively successful, as
expressed in the cable’s subject line: SPAIN: ATTORNEY
GENERAL RECOMMENDS COURT NOT PURSUE GTMO
CRIMINAL CASE VS. FORMER USG OFFICIALS.
On April 16, Spanish Attorney General Candido Conde
Pumpido had announced that he would not support this criminal
complaint because it is “’fraudulent,’ and has been filed as a political
statement to attack past USG policies.” According to the cable, his
legal reasoning was that a complaint targeting US “advisers” could not
be pursued in light of the fact that an earlier Spanish case
(unexplained in the cable) against Rumsfeld “had failed.” Like
Zaragoza’s comments documented in the previous cable, Conde
Pumpido said that “if there is evidence of criminal activity by USG
officials, then a case should be filed in the United States.” But, the
cable notes, he said that it would still be up to investigating judge
Garzón whether to pursue the case or not and that governmental
opposition alone could not derail it.
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The following day (April 17), Garzón bowed to the
arguments of Spanish prosecutors to have the case reassigned and he
forwarded it to National Court docketing authorities, who turned it
over to Judge Velasco. Although unmentioned in the cable, on May 4,
Velasco submitted an International Rogatory Letter to US Attorney
General Eric Holder asking for confirmation about “whether the facts
to which the complaint makes reference are or not now being
investigated or prosecuted.”
On April 29, Garzón announced that he was opening a new
investigation into alleged US torture at Guantánamo, although he did
not name any individual targets. The embarrassment and exclusion of
Garzón was the busywork of Spanish and American officials over the
following three weeks, according to the cable dated May 5. Embassy
officials met with Zaragoza on May 4 to discuss Garzón’s latest move.
Zaragoza said he had “directly and personally” asked Garzón if he had
announced a new investigation “to drum up more speaking fees…
Zaragoza opined that Garzón, having gotten his headline, would soon
drop the matter.” From there, the cable proceeds to describe
Zaragoza’s “strategy to force [Garzón’s] hand” if he does not drop the
case. Paradoxically, Zaragoza’s strategy aimed to use one
accountability-seeking case in Spain to derail Garzón’s new
investigation: It hinged on the fact that Garzón had ordered Spanish
police to visit Spanish detainees at Guantánamo in 2004. Zaragoza
reasoned that Garzón could be embarrassed into dropping the case
because he had appeared to condone the means by which the
evidence had been gathered that Spain subsequently used to prosecute
four former Guantánamo detainees, whose conviction was overturned
by the Supreme Court.
Zaragoza elaborated on his hand-forcing strategy: The police
officers Garzón had sent to Guantánamo were scheduled to testify
before Judge Moreno on the CIA flight case, and “Zaragoza hopes
their testimony will put on record Garzón’s role in the earlier cases.”
More ominously and, as it has turned out, presciently, Zaragoza was
also “banking on the fact that Garzón is already in hot water over his
excessive zeal in another case.” What he was referring to was the fact
that Garzón had garnered the wrath of Spanish fascists by opening an
investigation into Franco-era crimes when he ordered the exhumation
of nineteen mass graves in 2008. For disregarding the country’s
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amnesty law that had closed the book on crimes of that era (despite
that he was not seeking criminal indictments), he was accused of
exceeding his judicial authority and was suspended. In September
2010, the Supreme Court endorsed a lower court’s ruling that Garzón
should be tried.
The May 5 cable concludes with a summing up of where the
Bush Six case stood at the time. It notes that Zaragoza
is acting in good faith and playing a
constructive role…Nevertheless, we do not share his
optimism that this problem will go away anytime
soon. Having started, it is hard for us to see why the
publicity-loving Garzón would shut off his headlinegenerating machine unless forced to do so… We also
fear Garzón -- far from being deterred by threats of
disciplinary action -- may welcome the chance for
martyrdom, knowing the case will attract worldwide
attention. In any event, we will probably be dealing
with this issue for some time to come.
These three cables were published in El Pais on November
29, 2010, the day after they were released by Wikileaks. They
immediately elicited an outcry in Spain over their officials’ collusion
with US officials to thwart criminal investigations (see Democracy
Now 2010). On December 14, the New York City-based Center for
Constitutional Rights and the Berlin-based European Center for
Human Rights (2010), which had been assisting the Spanish lawyers
who made the complaint, submitted an expert opinion to the Spanish
National Court advising of additional information about the US
torture program that had come to light and, referencing the cables
themselves, efforts by the US to interfere politically with the Spanish
legal process. The following day Velasco issued an order to the
prosecution asking for its views on whether the case should proceed
or by which date the US should respond to the still-unanswered
questions in the Letter Rogatory.
AMERICA’S UNACCOUNTABLE RESPONSE
The Wikileaked cables about secretive
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interventions in the Spanish legal process contributed both directly
and indirectly to public knowledge about the status of torture
accountability in the US. On January 28, 2011, Velasco issued an order
that set March 1 as the deadline for the US response to his questions.
On exactly that date the US Justice Department sent a letter authored
by Mary Ellen Warlow in the Criminal Division’s Office of
International Affairs. Velasco subsequently issued a ruling in which he
“temporarily stayed” the case in Spain.
The Justice Department letter to Velasco is a succinct and
disturbing summary of how the US government has dealt with
well-substantiated evidence of the systematic and pervasive torture of
prisoners in the “war on terror.” The letter claims that the
“government of the United States, in various fora, has undertaken
numerous actions relating both to 1) the alleged mistreatment of
detainees at issue in the [Spanish] complaint; and 2) legal advice
provided in relation to the detainees.” The letter then proceeds to
describe these actions.
In regard to the issue of legal advice, the letter explains that
the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)
is the authority for investigating alleged misconduct by Justice
Department lawyers. The letter states that OPR conducted an
investigation into the activities of Bybee and Yoo, who had authored
some of the most significant memos relating to the interrogation of
detainees, including two dated August 1, 2002, one of which narrowed
the definition of physical torture to exclude anything less than “the
pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure,
impairment of bodily function, or even death,” and the second that
sanctioned tactics, including waterboarding, already in use by the CIA.
The blithe description of that investigation and its outcome
misrepresents the actual story, which is a sordid and politicized effort
to enforce unaccountability.
The OPR investigation was completed but not released under
President Bush, and was withheld from the public (without
explanation) until February 2010 (see US Department of Justice 2009).
When it was finally released, as astute observers had expected, the
OPR report contained substantial evidence that OLC lawyers had
colluded with the White House to “legalize” unlawful tactics. The
authors of the draft OPR report concluded that this constituted
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“professional misconduct,” which could have led to disbarment
proceedings. In the case of Bybee, it could have led to his
impeachment from the bench of the Ninth Circuit where he currently
sits. But instead of allowing that honest and accurate conclusion to be
adopted in the final report, Attorney General Holder authorized
David Margolis, a career Justice Department official, to make the final
determination. Margolis decided that the lawyers whose work had
been investigated had merely exercised “poor judgment.”
According to the Justice Department letter responding to
Velasco’s questions, in light of Margolis’s conclusion, “there exists no
basis for criminal prosecution of Yoo or Bybee.” This conclusion was
used by the government to also assert, as stated in the letter, that “the
Department of Justice has concluded that it is not appropriate to
bring criminal cases with respect to any other executive branch
officials, including those named in the complaint [i.e., Gonzales,
Addington, Feith, and Haynes], who acted in reliance on these and
related OLC memoranda with respect to their involvement with the
policies and procedures for detention and interrogation.”
In regard to other allegations of detainee mistreatment and
domestic accountability measures not specific to the Spanish
complaint, the letter cites two successful prosecutions in federal court
(David Passaro, a CIA contractor convicted for brutally assaulting a
detainee in Afghanistan in 2003, and Don Ayala, a private contractor
in Afghanistan who was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for the
death of a detainee whom “he and US soldiers had detained”). The
letter then proclaims that the “breadth of investigative actions” “show
that there are effective judicial processes under U.S. law for addressing
violations.”
As a matter of fact, aside from court martial proceedings or
administrative sanctions against approximately 100 soldiers, the Justice
Department never pursued any criminal “investigative actions”
involving those up the chain-of-command. Moreover, in every single
civil lawsuit brought by victims of US torture against civilian or
military officials or private corporations, the government mobilized an
expansive interpretation of the state secrets doctrine to shut them
down. Not a single official was ever held civilly liable in a US court,
and this was the direct result of the Justice Department’s successful
efforts to persuade judges that such cases are non-justiciable.
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The only area of criminal conduct that the Obama
administration authorized for investigation involved individual CIA
agents who might have “exceeded” the legal advice provided by OLC
lawyers. Mock execution was the one practice deemed to fall beyond
the pale of that advice. Assistant US Attorney John Durham was
tasked to investigate possible excesses as well as the CIA’s destruction
of videotapes of several detainees (which recorded their
waterboarding and other forms of violent abuse). In November 2010,
as the letter responding to Velasco states, Durham concluded that “it
was not appropriate to bring criminal charges with regard to the actual
destruction of the tapes.” The letter adds that Durham and his team’s
investigation into whether federal laws were violated in connection
with the interrogation of specific detainees is “ongoing, and its details
remain confidential.” Since then, Durham decided that the CIA agents
who exceeded the OLC guidelines should not be prosecuted (see
Human Rights Watch 2011).
UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES
The regime of secrecy, deception and unaccountability for
torture and other illegal actions by the US government was apparently
a factor in Bradley Manning’s decision to leak the largest trove of
classified materials in US history. On the diplomatic cables
specifically, Manning described their contents to Lamo as:
crazy,
almost
criminal
political
backdealings… the non-PR-versions of world events
and crises… its important that it gets out… i feel, for
some bizarre reason… it might actually change
something…
Manning will probably be convicted and face life in prison.
But the leakage for which he stands accused changed more than a
mere “something.” A leaked diplomatic cable from the Tunisian
Embassy was one catalyst in the December 2010 revolution in that
country that led, over a matter of days, to the end of the corrupt and
authoritarian regime of Zine Ben Ali. The Tunisian revolution sparked
the Egyptian revolution that started in earnest on January 25, 2011.
And the inspiration of sustained protests demanding the end of the
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regime of Hosni Mubarak set off the revolutionary events across the
region that have been described as the “Arab Spring.”
In a last ditch effort to hang onto power in the face of
massive, countrywide unrest, on January 29 Mubarak named Omar
Suleiman, head of Egypt’s General Intelligence Service (GIS), to fill
the long-vacant vice presidency. Suleiman’s promotion had been
predicted in a leaked cable with the title “Presidential Succession in
Egypt” dated May 14, 2007. Appointing Suleiman was a shrewd (but
ultimately unsuccessful) move because he was a favorite of
Washington, and Mubarak clearly hoped that this would motivate the
US to back his regime against revolutionary demands for his
departure.
In the mid-1990s, Suleiman worked closely with the Clinton
administration in devising and implementing the rendition program.
Back then, rendition involved kidnapping suspected terrorists and
transferring them to their home or a third country for trial. In The
Dark Side, Jane Mayer (2008: 113) describes how the rendition
program began during the Clinton years:
Each rendition was authorized at the very top levels
of both governments [the US and Egypt]....The longserving chief of the Egyptian central intelligence
agency, Omar Suleiman, negotiated directly with top
[CIA] officials. [Former US Ambassador to Egypt
Edward] Walker described the Egyptian counterpart,
Suleiman, as “very bright, very realistic,” adding that
he was cognizant that there was a downside to “some
of the negative things that the Egyptians engaged
in, of torture and so on. But he was not squeamish,
by the way.”
Mayer adds:
Technically, US law required the CIA to seek
“assurances” from Egypt that rendered suspects
wouldn't face torture. But under Suleiman's reign at
the EGIS, such assurances were considered close to
worthless. As Michael Scheuer, a former CIA officer
[head of the al-Qaeda desk] who helped set up the
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practice of rendition, later testified, even if such
“assurances” were written in indelible ink, “they
weren't worth a bucket of warm spit.”
When renditions got “extraordinary” during the Bush
administration, Egypt was a favorite destination to send detainees for
torture-by-proxy. One person extraordinarily rendered there was
Egyptian-born Australian citizen Mamdouh Habib. As Habib (2009)
recounts in his memoir, My Story: The Tale of a Terrorist Who Wasn’t, he
was repeatedly subjected to electric shocks, immersed in water up to
his nostrils, beaten, had his fingers broken, and was hung from metal
hooks. At one point, his interrogator slapped him so hard that his
blindfold was dislodged, revealing the identity of his tormentor:
Suleiman. Frustrated that Habib was not providing useful information
or confessing to involvement in terrorism, Suleiman ordered a guard
to murder a shackled Turkistani prisoner in front of Habib, which he
did with a vicious karate kick. In April 2002, after five months in
Egypt, Habib was rendered to American custody at Bagram prison in
Afghanistan, and then transported to Guantánamo. The day before he
was scheduled to be charged by the military commissions, Dana Priest
and Dan Eggen (2005) published a Washington Post exposé about
Habib’s torture. The US government immediately announced that he
would not be charged and repatriated him home to Australia.
A far more infamous torture case in which Suleiman also is
directly implicated is that of Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi, an alleged trainer at
al-Khaldan camp in Afghanistan. After he was captured by the
Pakistanis while fleeing across the border in November 2001, al-Libi
was sent to Bagram, then to a CIA black site on the USS Bataan in the
Arabian Sea, then extraordinarily rendered to Egypt. Al-Libi confessed
knowledge about a connection between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi regime
of Saddam Hussein. In early 2003, this was exactly the kind of
information that the Bush administration was seeking to justify a
“pre-emptive” attack on Iraq and to persuade reluctant allies to go
along. Indeed, al-Libi’s “confession” was one the central pieces of
“evidence” presented at the United Nations by Secretary of State
Colin Powell to make the case for war. However, that confession was
a lie tortured out of al-Libi by the Egyptians under Suleiman’s
supervision. CIA chief Tenet (2007: 353-354) provides his account of
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the al-Libi situation in his memoir, At the Center of the Storm:
We believed that al-Libi was withholding critical
threat information at the time, so we
transferred him to a third country for further
debriefing. Allegations were made that we did so
knowing that he would be tortured, but this is false.
The country in question [Egypt] understood and
agreed that they would hold al-Libi for a limited
period. In the course of questioning while he was in
U.S. custody in Afghanistan, al-Libi made initial
references to possible al-Qa'ida [sic] training in Iraq.
Then, shortly after the Iraq war got under way, alLibi recanted his story. Now, suddenly, he was saying
that there was no such cooperative training…He
clearly lied. We just don't know when. Did he lie
when he first said that al-Qa'ida [sic] members
received training in Iraq or did he lie when he said
they did not? In my mind, either case might still be
true…The fact is, we don't know which story is true,
and since we don't know, we can assume nothing.
The use of al-Libi’s statement in the build up to the Iraq war
and the subsequent revelation that he had recanted made him a huge
potential liability for the US. Al-Libi’s whereabouts were unknown
until April 2009 when HRW researchers doing an investigation about
the treatment of prisoners in Libya encountered him in the courtyard
of a prison in Tripoli. This prompted efforts by HRW to gain access
to al-Libi in order to question him about his experience. Two weeks
later, on May 10, al-Libi was dead, and the Qaddafi regime claimed it
was a “suicide” (Hajjar 2011). According to Evan Kohlmann (2009),
“Al-Libi’s death coincided with the first visit by Egypt’s spymaster
Omar Suleiman to Tripoli…By the time Omar Suleiman’s plane left
Tripoli, Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi had committed ‘suicide.’”
Several days after Suleiman was appointed vice president, the
Mubarak regime collapsed and was replaced by a military junta
operating under the title of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF). On September 8, 2011, after the dictatorial Libyan regime of
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Muammar al-Qaddafi had been routed from the capital city as a result
of the NATO-assisted revolution in that country, investigators started
combing the files in the office of the country’s security chief Moussa
Koussa. They found numerous cables from the CIA and Britain’s MI6
detailing Libya’s cooperative role in the extraordinary rendition
program.
After Mubarak fell, Egyptian protesters expressed their
loathing of the torture and police abuse that had been mainstays of
the regime for so long. Jails and prisons across the country were
attacked, in some places still containing the devices of torture. When
protesters seized the offices of the GIS, the Ministry of Interior and
other security centers, they found tons of recently shredded
documents presumably including information about Egypt’s role in
the US torture program. The reason for this presumption is that the
shredded tonnage did not include vast amounts of domestic police
files on Egyptians who had been imprisoned. Anti-torture activists
have speculated that in those hours as the regime collapsed, the CIA
urged counterparts in Egypt to destroy evidence that may be used for
future accountability-seeking initiatives in Egypt and elsewhere.
However, human rights lawyers had plans to pursue the prosecution
of Suleiman, including for his role in assisting US torture using
evidence contained in documents found in Libya as well as ones in
Egypt that escaped the shredder. Suleiman avoided that prospect by
dying
CONCLUSION
The rampancy and details of US torture became known to
Americans and the world against the will of government officials who
strived keep this information hidden. Because torture is a crime, the
lengths to which the government has gone to keep still-undisclosed
information secret, and to resist accountability at home and abroad is
an ongoing criminal enterprise. As the leaked diplomatic cables
indicate, public opinion in Europe has been broadly supportive of
criminal accountability for US torturers, even though—or in the case
of Spain, because—criminal complaints have been killed or suspended
through back channel tampering. While, at present, enforced
unaccountability has prevailed to keep US officials out of the docks of
foreign courts, new revelations about the torture program continue to
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come to light, including recently uncovered communiqués between
the CIA and now-deposed Arab dictators. The future consequences
and uses of that information may not be so easily managed through
government-to-government political arm twisting.
There is no legal immunity or any statute of limitations for
the gross crime of torture. Recent developments in Latin America are
suggestive of the possibility of future accountability. Many of the
region’s military regimes that had perpetrated mass torture (as well as
extra-judicial executions) granted themselves immunity as they vacated
power. Their impunity was supported or accepted at the time by large
sectors of those societies who wanted to “look forward, not
backward.” But the passage of time and changing political
environments brought forth a legal reckoning as some of those aging
torturers were put on trial and convicted (see Lutz and Reiger 2009).
However belated, these prosecutions have served to transform the
conditions in which impunity previously had thrived and have added
new and redeeming chapters to those nations’ histories. The record of
authoritarian-era struggles by lawyers and human rights activists that
bore little fruit at the time became a critical factor in recent quests for
justice and accountability.
The history of this era is defined both by torture and by
transnational efforts to stop and punish it. Ultimately, even failed
attempts to pursue accountability for those responsible for US torture
leave a noble record of efforts to enforce the law and validate the
norms and rules that were so flagrantly violated. These initiatives will
be important in the future, perhaps even more than at present, as a
record of resistance to inhumanity and dehumanization. Moreover, as
any good student of “law in action” knows, the impact of legal
initiatives cannot be assessed definitively by the immediate outcomes
of cases.
These efforts to hold US officials accountable are better
understood because of the leaked cables that reveal the lengths to
which the government has gone to thwart them. Or, to put it another
way, were it not for the leakage, we would know far less about the
disgraceful record of enforced unaccountability. It is not be hard to
predict who, in the future, will be remembered for being on the right
side of history.
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